This paper considers how insurance companies choose a price schedule for policies depending on the size of these policies which are determined by households. Under asymmetric information, we analyse the tension between self-selection and the density distribution of household by accident probability. The prot maximizing policy is compared to the socially optimal policy. JEL Classication: H21.H23, H31, H43, H42
Introduction
We describe here how an insurance company decides on the price schedule for insurance contracts against certain accidents (or medical needs) which it oers on the basis of the choices made by the customers themselves regarding the contracts that they purchase. The return from an insurance contract is a random variable which depends on the accident probability of the individual customer. While an individual may generally be assumed to be well-informed about his accident probability, the insurance rm has only imperfect information about this probability and, consequently, can only observe the relation between the type of insurance bought by dierent customers and their accident frequencies. This paper is concerned with the eect of such self-selecting information devices on the policy chosen by a prot maximizing rm. 1
We consider an insurance rm that establishes a price schedule for insurance contracts and allows customers indiscriminantly to determine the size of the contract. Accident-prone individuals are expected to purchase relatively large insurance policies, and may typically be willing to pay a higher price for them. It has thus been argued that this "adverse selection" aspect will induce rms to charge proportionately higher prices for large contracts. This argument disregards, however, the eect of the distribution of customers (by accident probabilities) on the optimum policy. If a suciently large number of customers is concentrated in the high-probabilities range, it may be protable, depending on demand characteristics, not to charge too high a price for large contracts. We rst consider a simple case in which the rm chooses a prot-maximizing linear policy, setting a quantity constraint on the size of permitted policies. The policy chosen by the monopoly is then compared with a policy of the same type that maximizes social welfare, dened as the sum of individuals' expected utilities. It is shown that the monopoly chooses to provide a lower return on contracts, or sets a lower quantity constraint, or both, compared with the social optimum. A second example provides an explicit solution for the prot-maximizing nonlinear schedule chosen by the rm. This example suggests that the schedule need not be convex throughout, due to the interaction of demands and the distribution of customers. The performance of markets when buyers or sellers have imperfect information concerning some relevant attributes has been of much recent interest. The implications for general equilibrium of contingent insurance contracts are discussed by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) . Other cases involving labor markets are discussed by Spence (1974) , Arrow (1973) , and Salop and Salop (1976) . This paper extends these works by allowing for nonlinear price schedules (including quantity constraints). The results, however, pertain only to special cases and can therefore be regarded only as illustrative. In solving the nonlinear problem, we make use of the methods developed to solve a similar problem in the theory of optimum income taxation [see Mirrlees (1971) and Sheshinski (1976) ].
The general problem
Consider a group of individuals, all of whom have some risk of suering an accident, which, if it occurs, does the same damage to each person. In the absence of insurance, all individuals are assumed to have the same income in each state: y 0 (y 0 > 0) if no accident occurs and y 1 (y 1 > 0) if an accident occurs. An insurance rm oers insurance contracts specifying that if a premium x (x > 0) is paid, the insured receives nothing if no accident occurs and receives x + s(x) (s(x) > 0) if an accident occurs. Thus, s(x) is the compensation, above the premium, paid in case of an accident.
Individuals choose their optimum insurance contracts by maximizing expected utility U . We assume that all individuals have the same strictly concave von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u (·), but dier with respect to the probability with which they suer accidents. We call an individual with an accident probability of p (1 > p > 0), a p-individual. Individuals are assumed to know their accident probabilities accurately. Thus, the p-individual maximizes his expected utility
(1) with respect to x.
We assume that the utility function u (·) is twice dierentiable and u > 0, u < 0 for all x ≥ 0. Further, in order to ensure that individuals choose to have a positive consumption in both states, we assume that u (0) = ∞. Suppose, nally, that the insurance policy s (·) is also twice dierentiable, with s > 0 for all x ≥ 0.
The rst-order condition for a maximum of (1) is then
The second-order condition for a unique global maximum is assumed to hold
for all 1 ≥ p ≥ 0 and y 0 > x ≥ 0. From (2) and (3) it is seen that the optimum x is increasing with p. Hence, given our assumptions, there exists a number p, 1 > p > 0, dened by the condition
such that the optimum of the p-individual x (p) is given by
wherex (p) is determined by the condition
By (3), (4) and (6) ,x p = 0 and dx /dp > 0 for p > p; that is, the size of the optimum policy continuously increases with the probability of accident.
The basic assumption concerning the imperfect information available to the insurance rm is that it cannot distiguish among individuals according to their accident probabilities, except by their market behavior. Any policy oered is therefore open to all individuals in the market without discrimination.
For a given policy s (·), expected prots of the form from a p-individual
where x (p) is given by (5) .
Let there be f (p) (f ≥ 0) p-individuals in the market. Normalizing the size of the potential customer population to unity, we may regard f (p) as a density function. Total expected prots of the form, R [s (·)], are then given by
The insurance rm is assumed to have information on individuals' behavior x (p) and on the density function f (p), and its objective is to nd the policy s (·) that maximizes (7).
Methods of the calculus of variations can be applied to solve this problem. The standard theory, however, has to be extended in order to take into account the constraint imposed by (2) . The structure of this problem is similar to the problem of the choice of an optimum income tax function [see Mirrlees (1971) and Sheshinski (1976) ]. As in that problem, the rst-order conditions for the appropriate maximization do not provide much insight into the method or the properties of the optimum function. We shall therefore proceed to consider special cases for which an explicit solution can be found. The rst case restricts the policy chosen by the rm to be linear with a ceiling on size. The other cases allow nonlinear policies but restrict the form of the utility function.
3 The optimum linear policy with a ceiling Suppose that the insurance rm oers a policy which is in xed proportion β (β > 0) to the premium paid, provided the size of the premium does not exceed a certain level, say, x. 2 Thus,
If the quantity constaint x is eective, then there exist numbers p and p, 1 > p > p > 0, dened by
The optimum of the p-individual is now given by
wherex (p) is determined by (6) .
By (10) and (13),x (p) = x. Total expected prots R (β, x) are given by
p) dp (14) Using (10), (11) and (13), the rst-order conditions for an interior maximum of (14) w.r.t β and x are, respectively,
pf (p) dp = 0 (15)
Dierentiating (13), we have
Substituting (17) into (15), using (13), we obtain
5 Equations (10), (11), (16), and (18) determine the prot-maximizing values of p, p, x, and β. Notice that for small β, the second term in (18) is small, and the sign of (18) is then the same as the sign of u (y 1 ) − u (y 0 ), which is positive, assuming that y 0 > y 1 .
Obviously, depending on y 0 , y 1 and the function f (p), conditions on u(·) may have to be imposed to ensure the existence of an interior optimum and the second-order conditions. We shall explore these conditions for a special case of the above model.
Let u (z) = log z. For this case, by (13),x = py 0 − [ (1−p)y1 /β]. By (10) and (11), we have
(19) and the rst order condition (18) becomes
Equations (16) 
2 f (p) dp y 0´p p p 2 f (p) dp + x´1 p pf (p) dp
In order to have β > 0, it is necessary (as assumed) that y 1 > 0. It can be shown that there are values of y 0 and y 1 which yield an interior solution and that satisfy the second-order conditions.
Comparison with the socially optimal policy
We want to compare the insurance policy chosen by the monopoly with a policy which is socially optimal under the same informational structure. Thus, the social planner, as the rm, cannot identify individuals by their accident probability, but knows the aggregate distribution f (p) and the relationx (p). We adopt the utilitarian objective, where social welfare W is given by the sum of individuals' expected utilities:
Consider the problem of maximizing (22) w.r.t β and x, subject to a budget constraint
for a given R > 0. To make the socially optimal policy comparable with the monopoly's policy, R should be equal to the maximum value of (14).
Using (10)- (13), the rst-order conditions for an interior maximum can be written
(25) where µ > 0 is a constant (Lagrange multiplier).
In order to compare the socially optimum values of β and x determined by the system (10), (11), (13), (24), and (25) with the values chosen by the monopoly, we need to determine the sign of ∂ 2 R /∂β∂x. By (16),
Since ∂ 2 R /∂x 2 = (βp + p − 1) f (p) ∂p /∂x < 0 and, by (10), ∂p /∂x > 0, it follows that βp + p − 1 < 0. Now, dierentiating (10), we obtain
Hence, the sign of (26) is negative provided ∂p /∂β ≥ 0. The latter holds, by
Assume, therefore, that ∂ 2 R /∂β∂x < 0. Since the last two terms in (24) and the last term in (25) are positive, the position of the curves ∂W /∂β = 0 and ∂W /∂x = 0 relative to the curves ∂R /∂β = 0 and ∂R /∂x = 0, is as indicated in Figure 1 . (The way in which these curves intersect is determined by secondorder conditions.) The monopoly optimum is indicated by M and the social optimum by P .
It is seen that the social optimum provides a higher marginal return β, or a higher ceiling x, or both, compared with the policy chosen by the monopoly. Clearly, the social optimum cannot have a lower marginal return and a lower ceiling than the monopoly's policy. 
A nonlinear example
We shall now consider a case in which, for a particular class of utility and density functions, an explicit nonlinear optimum policy can be derived.
Let u (y) = y
1/2
and dene Y and S to be
Expected utility is then
in the Y S plane indierence curves are straight lines with slope π ≡ (1p) /p. Since Y and S are strictly monotone functions of x, one can write S uniquely in terms of Y , S = S(Y ). For the individual to have a unique optimum, the function S(Y ) has to be strictly concave. We shall have to check later whether the optimum solution satises this condition. The p-individual's maximization condition is
which, together with the constraint S = S(y), solves for the optimum pair (S (π) , Y (π)). From (30),
8 By (7), (8) and (28), expected prots are given by
where g (π) dπ = −pf (p) dp. Since y 0 π + y 1 is not controlled by the rm, its objective can be restated as
subject to (11) . Forming the Lagrangean function, the Euler equations with respect to S (π) and Y (π) are
where λ (π) is the "shadow-price" function. Combining (34) and (35), we may write these as
Equations (36) and (31) form two rst-order dierential equations which may be solved for Y (π) and S (π), ince mg(π) is specied.
As an example, consider the density function g (π) = 1 /π. By denition, this implies that f (p) = 1/(1−p)p 3 , which is a U-shaped density with concentration of individuals at the two extremes. Condition (36) become
with solution
for some constant a > 0. From (19) and (11),
To make sure that Y > 0 (y 0 > x), we assume that there is a positive lower bound on π, denoted π 0 , which satises Y (π 0 ) > 0.
The nal step is to minimize (33) with respect to a, but we shall delete this condition.
Notice also that the concavity of S(Y ), required for the uniqueness of the individual maximization solution (30), is satised. By (39) and (40), d 2 S /dY 2 = − a /π(1−π) 2 < 0.
Equations (39), (31), and (28) determine implicitly the optimum policy s(x). Dierentiating, using (28), (38), and (40), we obtain
Also, using (39)-(42), we have
b + a log π 1 + π (43) Since dx /dp < 0, we have from (43) that d 
